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ABSTRACT: Thomas Aquinas and Mulla Sadra both criticized the previous theories on the soul-
body problem, which held that the body is a mere instrument in the employ of the soul. Instead, 
they, following Aristotle, regard the connection between the soul and the body as form and matter 
since, they thought of it as an essential connection not accidental. Despite this initial similarity 
there are differences between Aquinas and Sadra on this problem which in the end lead them to 
two distinctive results.   
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The Problem  
The human being is one being in the order of existence but it is a composite reality of the body and 
the soul. The idea that the human being consists of two distinct things/dimensions is basic to any 
consideration of the relationship between the soul and the body. The problem is: how we can 
explain the relation between the human soul, a nonmaterial essence and the body, a material 
essence. This problem which is one of the most important in Aquinas’ metaphysics and in Sadra’s 
philosophical psychology, is called the mind-body problem in modern western philosophy due to 
the fact that ‘mind’ was used instead of soul for the first time by Descartes.  
Investing this problem, we begin by examining Aquinas’ treatment of the problem, attempting to 
show how Aquinas provides an alternative solution through appeal to Aristotle. Next we deal with 
Sadra’s response to the Avicennan paradigm of his day. In conclusion we will compare the two 
theories of Aquinas and Sadra. 
The view of Aquinas 
 Aquinas dealt with the soul-body problem in his works comprehensively. This question came in Q. 
76 of Summa Theologiae, the longest article of the treatise, after the issue of the soul’s nature. In 
addition, he discusses various explanations of the relation/unity of soul and body in Summa Contra 
Gentiles (II, 56, 68-70), and in Questiones disputate De Anima. Thomas has discussed, firstly, various 
alternative theories of the unity of the soul and the body in a dialectical inquiry, next he attempts to 
show numerous difficulties which rise for the thesis proposed by Plato (424-348 BC) (and 
Augustinians) and Averroes (1126-1198) as most famous commentator of Aristotle’s text in his time.   
Aquinas’ treatise reveals many significant points. Through the dialectical encounter with 
Platonic and Islamic philosophical views of soul and body, he is able to introduce and refine a 
number of principles: the relationship between first and second act, substantial form as principle of 





Aquinas’ position on the Plato-Augustinian Theory  
Aquinas deals with Plato’s doctrine on the soul-body problem, but he thinks that this theory faces 
with a great difficulties. Thomas firstly quotes the Plato-Augustinian theory: 
The intellectual soul is not united to the body as form to matter, but only as mover to 
movable, for Plato said that the soul is in the body ‘as a sailor in a ship.’ Thus, the union 
of soul and body would only be by contact of power. [...] On Plato’s theory, then, a man is 
not one unqualifiedly speaking, nor, consequently, is he a being unqualifiedly speaking, 
but a being by accident. In order to avoid this, Plato asserted that man is not a being 
composed of body and soul, but that the soul itself using the body is man.
2
  
According to this passage, which was based on the definition of the human being as ‘a soul using 
body’, soul and body were separate substances, but each soul had its own body, for which it had 
been created and to which it would be restored at the final Resurrection.
3
 Here, it may be expected 
that the Augustinian theory on relation between soul and body follow entirely in the wake of the 
Platonists. Aquinas rejects the Plato-Augustinian theory, because he thinks that Platonists have to 
suppose that the soul is united to the body through some intermediary, since diverse and distinct 
substances cannot be bound together unless something unites them.
4
 In reply to the question of 
‘Whether the soul is joined to the animal body by means of some other body?’ he argues such: 
If the soul, according to the Platonists, were united to the body merely as a motor, it would 
be right to say that some other bodies must intervene between the soul and body of man, or any 
animal whatever; for a motor naturally moves what is distant from it by means of something 
nearer. If, however, the soul is united to the body as its form, [...] it is impossible for it to be 
united by means of another body. The reason of this is that a thing is one, according as it is a 
being. Now the form, through itself, makes a thing to be actual since it is itself essentially an act; 
nor does it give existence by means of something else. Wherefore the unity of a thing composed 
of matter and form, is by virtue of the form itself, which by reason of its very nature is united 
to matter as its act. Nor is there any other cause of union except the agent which causes matter to 
be in act, as the Philosopher says.
5
 
For this reason, Aquinas holds that the best approach is to understand the soul as the form of 
the body. Indeed, he proposes an essential relation between soul and body. In this view, none of 
their presumed entities are necessary if the soul is the form of the body. Since:  
Anything whatever inasmuch as it is a being is one. Hence, a form is united to prime 
matter by virtue of itself and not by any other bond, because a form, by its very nature, 
gives to matter its act of existing.
6
  
Therefore, Aquinas claimed that a spiritual substance, which is united with a body only as its 
mover, is united with it only through power (potentiam vel virtutem). In other words, a spiritual 
substance united to a body merely as its motor is united to it by way of pure force without material 
contact, but the intellectual soul is joined to its body, as we will show soon, as the form by which it 




Aristotle defined the soul in the second book of De Anima as ‘the first entelechy/perfection of a 
natural organized body possessing the capacity of life.’
8
 This definition clearly implies that the soul 
is not a separate substance, capable of existing independently of the body. It is the entelechy of a 
natural organized body, which must be accounted as an immanent principle organized body. Thus, 
the soul is not a principle ‘apart’ from the body which animates it.
9
  
At the same time, Aristotle in the same work extends the question as to whether the soul may not 
be the entelechy of the body, in the sense in which a pilot is the entelechy of a ship.
10
 This question 
reflects Aristotle’s doubt as to whether the human intellect may not be separable after physical 
death, while the rest of the soul deceases, and it is probable that he believed in the survival of the 
human intellect after it is developed by purely intellectual operations. Here, Aristotle’s 




Philosophers throughout the various periods of philosophical psychology have adopted these 
two views. In our discussion, it is worthwhile to consider Aquinas in a way that could display the 
best aspects of Aristotle’s theory proposing an alternative solution for the soul-body problem. His 
understanding of the soul-body problem led him to adopt the first view of Aristotle, avoiding the 
outcomes of the Plato-Augustinian theory. His view can be formulated as follows: 
1. The human soul is a formative principle of the body.
12
  
2. The human soul is an immaterial, substantial, simple, and incorruptible form.
13
 
3. The human soul is a substance in its own right and the substantial form of the body. The soul 
informs a unity so that the act of being/existing
14
 of the compound whole is the soul’s act of 
being/existing on the other.
15
  
In support of the first proposition Aquinas, following Aristotle, writes: 
The intellect which is the principle of intellectual operation is the form of the human body. 
For that whereby primarily anything acts is a form of the thing to which the act is to 
be attributed [...] the reason is because nothing acts except so far as it is in act; wherefore a 
thing acts by that whereby it is in act. Now it is clear that the first thing by which the body 
lives is the soul. And as life appears through various operations in different degrees 
of living things, that whereby we primarily perform each of all these vital actions is the soul. 
For the soul is the primary principle of our nourishment, sensation, and local movement; 
and likewise of our understanding. Therefore this principle by which we primarily 




From the above argument Aquinas concluded that the human soul’s mode of existence is the 
substantial form constituting the material substance that the human being is. It is entirely different 
in nature from that of lower forms, including the animal soul and the souls of other living things. 
It means that its existence transcends material things. It also means that the immateriality of the 
intellectual soul is not endangered if, at one and the same time, it is a substance in its own right and 
the substantial form of the human body. Here though Aquinas agrees clearly with Aristotelian 
substantialism, he passes beyond it with regard to his doctrine of ‘act of being/existing’.  
In keeping with this doctrine, the soul and the body do not exist independently. Rather the 
intellectual soul is the actualizing form of the body. Since ‘forms dependent on matter as regards 
being do not have being themselves, strictly speaking: rather, the composites have being through the 
forms.’
17
The soul, which is the form of the body, has its being only in the being of the body and 
cannot exist or act apart from it. The human soul manages it, though, through its faculties and 
forces.
18
 Here it should be added that this theory is clearly rooted in the other theory of being, in 
terms of esse or the act of being/existing.
19
  
The View of Mulla Sadra 
The long history of the soul-body problem goes back to the first period in the history of Islamic 
philosophical psychology, which is an amalgamation of Aristotelianism and Neo-platonism created 
by later Hellenic philosophy, particularly as expressed in the Neo-platonising commentators of 
Aristotle. Muslim philosophers more or less shared a common background regarding the soul-body 
problem, which was neither Platonic nor Aristotelian exclusively but a mixture of both of these 
elements in varying degrees according to differences of temperament and individual 
inclination.
20
The soul-body problem for medieval Muslim thinkers, at the same time, was mostly a 
metaphysical problem. It was to a much lesser extent seen as an epistemological and a semantic 
problem. This is not to say that they were not concerned with epistemological and semantic 
problems, but that the soul-body problem was not merely such a problem.  
Earlier, Ibn Sina (980-1037) and al-Suhrawardi (1154-91) for the most part had an influence on 
Sadra’s theory about this problem. However, we try to take just Ibn Sina’s view into account. Ibn 
Sina, who was influenced by a host of classical and Hellenistic philosophers, agreed with the 
Aristotelian definition of the human soul that it is ‘the first entelechy of a natural body possessing 
organs insofar as it commits acts of rational choice and deduction through opinion; and insofar as 
it perceives universal matters.’
21
He held with Aristotle that the soul is the form/entelechy of the 
body but contrary to him claimed that the soul is a subsistent being in its own right, and a complete 
substance independent of any relation it has to the body.  
Ibn Sina writes:   
The soul comes into existence whenever a body does so fit to be used by it. The body which thus 
comes into being is the kingdom and instrument of the soul. In the very disposition of the 
substance of the soul which comes into existence together with a certain body-a body, that is to 
say, with the appropriate qualities to make it suitable to receive the soul which takes its origin 
from the first principles- there is a natural yearning to occupy itself with that body, to use it, 
control it, and be attracted by it.
22
  
More concisely, according to Ibn Sina: (a) the soul, according to its definition, is the form of the 
body. (b) The human soul is an immaterial and spiritual substance capable of existing 
independently of the body. (c) The soul comes into existence together with a certain body, to use it, 
control it, and be attracted by it. 
 
Mulla Sadra’s Theory: The Gathered Reality of Human Beings 
Sadra begins discussion on the soul-body problem in a passage of his with classification of six kinds 
of connection (al-ta‘alluq), by which a thing is related to another.
 23
 It should be noted that Ibn SÐnÁ, 




First: the connection via quiddity and meaning, both mentally and extra-mentally, such as 
the connection of quiddity to existence. Second: that of essence and reality, such as the 
connection of contingent to necessary. Third: that of essence and being-species (al-
nuw‘iyyah) together with the essence of that which is connected and its being-species, such 
as the connection of the accident black to its subject such as body (al-Jiism). Fourth: that 
of existence and its individuation as temporal creation and subsistence (bihasab al-wujud, 
huduthan wa baqa’an) to the nature connected to it and its being-species, such as the 
connection of form to matter. Fifth: that of existence and its individuation as creation 
but not as subsistence (bihasab al-wujud wa al-tashakhkhus, huduthan la baqa’an), like the 
connection of the soul to the body, according to us [that is, Sadra, himself]. Sixth: the 
connection of a thing to a thing for the gradual perfection and acquisition of virtues for 
the existence (bihasab al-istikmal wa ’iktisab al-fadilah li al-wujud), not with respect to the 
root of existence, such as the absolute connection of the soul to the body according to the 
majority of philosophers.
25
   
What is clear from the text is that Sadra regarded the soul and the body connection, somehow as 
the ‘withness’(ma‘iyyah) of the matter and form, in which there is no inseparability between the two. 
Indeed, it is a logical withness.
26
 Sadra says that:  
The ruling-property of the soul at the beginning of its generation and creation is the 
ruling-property of the material natures, which needs the matter indetermined in existence, 
and it also connects to the bodily matter which is indetermined in existence so that its 




So, each one of the soul and the body needs the other in some way which does not entail 
circularity. In other words:  
The body needs the soul for its actualization, not for its particular aspect but for its 
absolute aspect. The soul needs the body, not for its aspect of the absolute, intelligible 




Therefore, according to Sadra’s explanation, the soul requires a body both in its creation but not 
in its survival.  
 
The Foundations of Sadra’s Theory 
Sadra’s solution, indeed is concluded from: (a) his specific view on form-matter (hylomorphism), 
and (b) his principle of createdness (huduth) of the soul, which should be attentively understood 
under his innovative metaphysical principles, specifically the primordiality of existence (asalat al-
wujud), the systematic ambiguity (al-tashkik) of existence, and substantial motion (al-harakah al-
jawhariyah). Based on these metaphysical principles Sadra rejects the Peripatetic theory, which as we 
mentioned above, the soul is connected to the body because of perfection and acquiring virtue in 
existence (istikmal wa iktisab al-fadilah li-al-wujud). Let us to explain Sadra’s theory in light of his 
basic metaphysical principles. 
 
The Natural Unified Composition of the Form Matter 
According to Sadra’s opinion, the soul is the first perfection/entelechy (kamalun awwalun) for the 
natural organic body possessing the capacity of life. As is clear from the definition, Sadra accepts 
that the connection of the soul with the body should be analysed according to the Aristotelian 
theory of form-matter composition (al-tarkib al-tabi‘i al-ittihadi).  
He argues that status of the soul qua soul is the same as everything else naturally embodied in 
matter, since the modality of their being is one of connection (with a body), because its status is the 
same as everything else naturally embodied in matter.
29
 However, Sadra comes to propose a new 
interpretation of the Aristotelian doctrine, considering his metaphysical principles: primordiality of 
existence, systematic ambiguity of existence (tashkik al-wujud) and substantial movement, as we will 
show soon. 
As to the prevailing Aristotelian theory of form-matter connection, the body as prime matter, is 
mere potentiality, but becomes actualized when form (human soul), is connected to it. There is a 
necessarily mutual need between soul and body, as two parts of the human being’s essence, which 
constitutes a kind of composition in the external world by way of ‘unification’. There is a complete 
agreement among all peripatetic philosophers (notably al-Farabi (872-950) and Ibn Sina) that this 
kind of form-matter composition is a natural annexed composition (al-tarkib al-tabi‘i al-indimami).
30
  
Here, however, Sadra offers another kind of unification, which is opposed to it, that is, natural 
unified composition.
31
He repeatedly emphasizes that ‘the soul has an essential connection with the 
body; the compound of the two is a natural, unified compound; that simultaneously in each one 
there is substantial, essential movement.’
32
 Sadra also, based on this theory, argues that if the soul 
did not have the unifying relationship with its body, then, the bad temperament of its body or the 
breaking down of unification of its parts would not be painful to it as sensory pain, such as the 
intellective or imaginative pain do.
33
     
Therefore, the human soul in Sadra’s view is corporeal in existence and disposal, spiritual in 
subsistence and intellection (jismaniyat al-huduth wa al-tasarruf, ruhaniyat al-baqa’ wa al-ta‘aqqul). 
Thus, the thing in its perfect state occurs necessarily in actuality, while in the privative state it is 
contingent and potential. For this reason, again one can argue for the unification of matter with the 
form (in all natural being).
34
 Therefore, that is an inherent connection, which relates to the root of 
existence. 
According to the Sadrian view of the ambiguity and substantial movement of existence, the 
human soul has many levels and stations, from the beginning of its generation to the end of its goal; 
and it has certain essential states and modes of being.
35
 For this reason, the soul and the body are the 
levels of one existent. The body is the stage (martabah) of hardness and heaviness for that being 
while the soul constitutes a degree of lightness and subtlety. So, the unified mobile/moving 
existence of the soul as an imperfect being has an innate inclination or yearning towards its 
perfection, from the ‘corporeal substance’ degree toward ‘immaterial substance’ degree.  
The soul is a ‘corporeal substance’ in its first state of generation. According to the principle of 
corporeal in existence, spiritual in subsistence of the human soul, Sadra argues that existence of the 
soul is not a created existence, but a subsisting existence; the former is material, the latter is separate 
from the matter. That is clearly counter to the preceding major philosophers, which held the 
principle of spiritual in existence and subsistence. Now, its state at the creation is not like its state at 
its perfection and going towards the Active Principle.
36
 Therefore, the human soul, which becomes 
immaterial, simple, and an incorruptible form, needs the body merely because of its 
creation/origination. However, it simultaneously connects to the body for the gradual perfection 
and acquisition of virtues for existence. Up to this point, Sadra agrees with those philosophers, who 
believe that the human soul connects to the body but for the acquisition of perfection. That is 
because souls at the beginning of their generation are devoid of perfections and existential 






Aquinas and Sadra both challenged the theories of their day on the soul-body relation. As we have 
above seen, these theories were the Platonic-Augustinian theory and Ibn Sina’s theory, respectively. 
These two different solutions to the problem have seemingly just one origin. The soul is a subsistent 
being in its own right, a complete substance independent of any relation it has to the body. Then, 
the connection between soul and body does not produce an absolute oneness, but it is a union 
being only accidental. Aquinas and Sadra both argued that the connection between soul and body is 
an essential connection and not an accidental connection. 
For Aquinas and Sadra the coming into being of an immaterial substance in the course of time 
does not present any great difficulty. The reason that they both gave was that the creative influx is a 
permanent causality, namely God, which gives being to all new entities that appear in the course of 
the universe’s development. Therefore, according to his view, the human soul is directly created by 
God at the end of a biological process that leads to the production of a new human individual. 
Aquinas and Sadra, however, explain this view, in different ways. Aquinas, for his view on the 
subsistence of the soul, thought that when the body is prepared, God gives the soul to it. However, 
Sadra based on the principle ‘the soul is corporeal in existence, spiritual in subsistence’ (jismaniyat 
al-huduth, ruhaniyat al-baqa) held that the soul is corporeal at the beginning of its creation.  
Both Aquinas and Sadra consider the soul-body problem as a metaphysical problem and to a 
much lesser extent an epistemological and a semantic problem. As we have seen above, Aquinas and 
Sadra both used Aristotelian concepts to explain unifying the soul and body through their 
conceptualisation of the human soul as a substantial form. Indeed, both philosophers used 
Aristotelian terms as the starting point to explain the problem. So, the influence of Aristotle to both 
figures cannot be overlooked.   
On the one hand, there are some innovative concepts or even common interpretations in 
Aquinas and Sadra equally, which influenced their solution. In Aquinas, for instance, one faces the 
key term ‘act of being/existing’. This was a re-conception of the Aristotelian essence as potential to 
the act of existing.
38
 Also in Sadra we find ‘unified composition’, which was a new interpretation of 
the natural annexed composition. On the other hand, important conceptual differences between 
Aquinas and Sadra can be found. Both figures think of the connection of the soul to body not 
merely as an ‘incidental appendage’, instead as an ‘essential composition’. Here, both consider the 
relationship of the soul with the body as an intimate relationship, like the relationship of form and 
matter. Sadra however, on the theory of unified composition presents a new kind of relation of the 
soul/form to the body/matter. This is a novel explanation of composition which actually relates to 
his metaphysical principles. 
 
 
Table of Key Transliterated Terms 
Term Appearing in Text                                  Arabic                                   Fully Transliterated Term 
 
asalat al-wujud                                                 اصانه انىجىد                                                asÁlat al-wujÙd 
bihasab al-wujud, huduthan wa baqa’an ئاتحسة انىجىد،حذوثا و تقا   biÎasab alwujÙd hudÙthan wa baqÁ’an                                                  
bihasab al-wujud wa al-tashakhkhus,      تحسة انىجىد و انتشخص           biÎasab alwujÙd wa al-tashakhkhuÒ  
huduthan la baqa’an                                                     ئاحذوثا ال تقا                          hudÙthan lÁ baqÁ’an  
bihasab al-istikmal wa ’iktisab           تحسة اإلستكمال و إكتساب                    biÎasab al-’istikmÁl wa ’iktisÁb 
al-fadilah li al-wujud                             انفضيهح نهىجىد                                               al-faÃÐlah li al-wujÙd 
al-Farabi                                                             انفاراتي                                                              al-fÁrÁbÐ 
al-harakah al-jawhariyah                                   انحركح انجىهريح                           al-Îarakah al-jawharÐyah 
al-huwiyyah                                                            انهىيح                                                       al-huwÐyyah 
huduth                                                                    حذوث                                                             hudÙth 
al-Jiism                                                                   انجسم                                                               al-Jism 
jismaniyat al-huduth wa al-tasarruf,           جسمانيح انحذوث و انتصرف     jismÁnÐyat al-ÎudÙth wa al-taÒarruf 
ruhaniyat al-baqa’ wa al-ta‘aqqul                  روحانيح انثقاء و انتعقم            rÙhanÐyat al-baqÁ’ wa al-ta‘aqqul  
kamalun awwalun                                              کمال  اول                                             kamÁlun awwalun  
Kitab al-ShifaÞ                                                   ءكتاب انشفا                                                 KitÁb al-ShifÁ’  
KitÁb al-NajÁt                                                    كتاب اننجاج                                               Kitab al-Najat 
ma‘iyyah                                                                 معيح                                                            ma‘Ðyyah 
martabah                                                                 مرتثح                                                         martabah 
al-Suhrawardi                                                  انسهروردي                                                  al-SuhrawardÐ  
al-tarkib al-tabi‘i al-ittihadi                          التركيب الطبيعی االتحادي                 al-tarkÐb al-ÔabÐ‘Ð al-ittiÎÁdÐ 
al-tarkib al-tabi‘i al-indimami                   االنضمامي انطثيعي انتركية               al-tarkÐb al-ÔabÐ‘Ð al-inÃimÁmÐ 
al-ta‘alluq                                                               انتعهق                                                          al-ta‘alluq 
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